Two mayors, both dealing with environmental concerns by a nearby battery processing facilities, explain their fundamentally different approach to the same problem.
During the Orbán era, ministries distinguished between "hostile" and "firendly" media when answering inquiries, and every reply had to be approved from the top. Things began to change after the election.
A former tabloid journalist, Ágnes Forgács worked for Ripost, an outlet that combined tabloid methods with intelligence material likely coming from government sources for political goals.
We looked into the contracts of the Danube Institute, through which the previous gorvernment payments millions to the European right-wing populist movement and U.S. public figures close to Trump.
We understand that the Tisza Party intends to offer "Buddha" an important position in the Ministry of the Interior, but they have not responded to our questions regarding his past.
Environmental regulations in the automotive industry are stricter in Hungary than in Germany, said PM Viktor Orbán in 2023. He was mistaken.
The activities of Brussels-based news site Brussels Signal were financed in full by Fidesz-aligned media holding Mediaworks during 2024, to the tune of EUR 1.5m.
Entities in the orbit of BLA, MCC – known financiers of the Orbán government’s influence machinery – revealed to have received funding from Hungarian culture fund’s scandalous recent grants.
They classify the defective batteries as ordinary goods and do not label the shipment as hazardous; they transport them to warehouses in Hungary and then on to Poland.
Despite handling hazardous materials, the authorities did not require the battery waste processing plant to acquire an environmental permit.
The government has not only stoked anti-refugee sentiment but has also linked existing anti-Roma prejudices to this new enemy stereotype.
Hungary’s 2026 election brought historic political change, with the opposition overcoming a system tilted in favor of the ruling party.
Over the past two decades, systemic election fraud, vote-buying for money and drugs, and blackmail has ran rampant in the impoverished countryside of Hungary. We talked to the head of the volunteer group who decided to put a stop to this practice.
Conventional wisdom held that Fidesz has an iron grip on Hungary’s rural regions, however, this is exactly where Orbán's party suffered its most painful losses.
Tisza was not their first assignment: for years, they have been working against the political opposition using illegal, secret service methods.
Danube Institute, a center of Viktor Orbán's international unfluence network, cited “safety concerns” and “right to privacy” to keep high-paying government-funded contracts anonymous.
The government promised twice to detain and prosecute illegal migrants, but in the last few years, they did the opposite, while border protection costs surged.
Before the election, forged signatures helped candidates to get on the ballots, while election day rules effectively allow ballot stuffing, forged ballots, and vote buying.
Átlátszó obtained photos of Lajos Kósa behind the wheel of a Ferrari owned by Gábor Szilágyi, and other materials connecting the Fidesz politician to the bankrupt Bászna Gabona Zrt.
Amid the technical and political uncertainties surrounding the Druzhba pipeline and diplomatic tensions around the southern alternative route, Hungary’s position can no longer be described as an active distributor, but rather as an import-dependent and exposed country.
