Dead People and Unwitting Voters Used on Recommendation Sheets

In the final stretch of the Hungarian parliamentary elections campaign, more and more people are discovering that their names appear on candidate recommendation sheets they have never signed. The phenomenon is not new: mass falsification of signatures has been documented in previous elections as well. Recycled lists, data leaks, barter-based sham parties and campaign funds distributed in paper bags — we investigated the hidden business of the upcoming elections.

After we reported about the topic, dozens of readers came forward reporting that, after checking through the government’s online system, they found themselves listed as supporters of candidates they have never even heard of. Some were shown as having supported multiple candidates across different counties simultaneously — both valid and invalid recommendations — while others encountered the signature of a long-deceased spouse. We also came across a suspicious call: in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county’s Nagyecsed, people are being offered 5,000 forints (approximately 12 euros) in exchange for their personal data.

Our reader, Norbert (name changed upon request) logged into the government site in early March on a friend’s advice to check whether his name appeared on any party’s recommendation sheet ahead of the elections. He expected the site to show that he had signed for no one. Instead, he found something surprising: according to the system, he had supported two different candidates.

Two people completely unknown to him, through two parties he had never even heard of.

The signatures were ultimately invalid since he and his wife had moved out of the county years earlier. But the question remains: how could his endorsement end up with a party he never signed for?

“In theory, a signature is required for a recommendation, and that definitely didn’t happen. We don’t even know who these people are,” he wrote to Átlátszó.

Pattern of Abuse

Norbert is not alone. Based on dozens of screenshots sent to us, what happened to him is not unique, nor limited to a single region or party.

The names and personal identification numbers of individuals — a sensitive data not typically used in everyday transactions and does not appear in most databases accessible to the average person — often seen on recommendation sheets for multiple different parties: several readers found themselves listed alongside three to five different candidates at the same time.

The phenomenon is not new — Átlátszó already covered abuses related to recommendation sheets in 2018 and 2022 — but now that anyone can check through the government portal in just a few clicks, these abuses have become a lot more visible.

After our first article, we contacted the National Police Headquarters. According to their response, dozens of similar cases have already led to investigations: 42 cases of misusing private documents, 2 cases of misuse of personal data, and 36 cases of crimes against the integrity of elections.

That’s 80 criminal proceedings so far — and the campaign is still ongoing.

When asked whether this represents an increase compared to previous elections, the police did not provide a clear answer stating the data is not yet final.

Where did all the fake signatures go?

Based on the reader reports we received, we identified a total of 21 candidates whose recommendation sheets contain falsified entries, sometimes multiple. The party of well-known anti-vaccine pharmacist György Gődény, Normális Élet Pártja (Normal Life) stands out with a particularly high number of suspicious recommendations. There are also cases where someone appears to have submitted both valid and invalid signatures simultaneously across multiple parties.

Our breakdown of candidates linked to fake recommendations:

Democratic Coalition (DK)

• Richárd Halmai (Budapest 02)

Fidesz–KDNP

• Béla Dankó (Békés 02)

Jobbik

• Miklós Szanyó (Budapest 04)
• Dániel Zsiga-Kárpát (Budapest 11)
• Izabella Kornélia Nemesné Nagy (Győr-Moson-Sopron 01)
• Petra Pápai (Győr-Moson-Sopron 02)
• Béla Szatmári (Csongrád 03)
• Réka Buczkó (Veszprém 01)

Normal Life (Normális Élet Pártja)

• Tímea Farkas (Budapest 15)
• Mária Varga (Budapest 04)
• Csaba Róbert Patáki (Budapest 06)
• Krisztina Dolányi (Budapest 11)
• Gáborné Ganji (Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 01)
• Nikoletta Vasárus (Győr-Moson-Sopron 02)
• Ferenc Kuzmits (Veszprém 01)
• Béláné Lázi (Zala 01)
• Bertalanné Csikó (Fejér 01)

Our Homeland (Mi Hazánk)

• Ferenc Árpád Miklós (Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 01)

Solidarity Party / Hungarian Workers’ Party

• György Simon (Budapest 02)
• Csaba Galó (Békés 02)

Independent candidate

• Gábor Nyikos (Győr-Moson-Sopron 03)

The list is far from complete, as new cases continue to come in everyday. It is particularly alarming that more than half of the recommendations identified by voters as fake are still considered valid, while the rest were invalidated only due to formal errors — for example incorrectly entered data.

Industrial-scale copying

Current cases strongly resemble abuses uncovered in previous years: the same parties repeatedly appear, voters often show up as supporting politically opposing candidates at the same time, and their personal identification number is always included on the fake sheets. This is particularly striking because this identifier is usually not requested by any authority, yet it appears on forged recommendation sheets.

Four years ago, authorities offered two possible explanations. The first: personal data may have leaked from an official body or municipal database. Access to such systems requires authorization, so unauthorized access alone would raise criminal concerns. The second: databases are being traded. One notable example was the Allies of Mária Seres (SMS) led by Mária Seres: in 2013, they were able to succeed as national candidates using a database originally collected in 2009 during a referendum initiative.

Seres and her husband, Ottó Stekler were later charged after failing to account for at least 117 million forints in campaign funds.

Seres became nationally known in 2009 when she initiated a referendum as a private citizen to abolish MPs’ expense reimbursements without receipts. The initiative was hugely successful: she collected several hundred thousand signatures — an outstanding achievement for a civic action. The referendum was ultimately canceled after parliament changed the rules, but the signatures — hundreds of thousands of names, addresses and signatures — remained.

After 2010, electoral reforms created a new situation: the government simplified candidate nomination, replacing earlier methods with recommendation sheets and requiring only 500 valid signatures per candidate. At the same time, substantial public campaign funding was introduced. This system created ideal conditions for sham parties, which could access significant public funds with minimal social support.

According to the documentary Rablópártok by Partizán, the Seres–Stekler network was far more extensive: former candidates claimed that parties linked to the group may have taken in more than two billion forints in public funding across various formations. According to these accounts, industrial-scale copying took place during signature collection, and part of the campaign money was distributed in cash — sometimes literally from paper bags.

Quadrennial déjá vu

A recurring element in these stories is that databases from previous signature collections continued to exist and may have been reused in later elections — since collecting endorsements is the biggest challenge in candidate nomination.

In 2018, Átlátszó already mapped abuses related to recommendation sheets, after more than thirty readers reported misuse of their data. Some appeared on seven different parties’ sheets; while others encountered the signature of a long-deceased spouse.

After the election, national police reported 111 criminal proceedings related to document forgery. Based on local election office data, we identified more than twice as many cases — 280 in total. Only one of them led to actual charges.

In 2022, the issue resurfaced when the online system became available. Again, fraudulent endorsements appeared en masse, especially linked to smaller parties. Authorities then reported 68 cases.

These cases highlight a fundamental problem: oversight mechanisms have not kept pace with opportunities for abuse. There is no real-time verification of whether a person actually signed a sheet, invalidation procedures are complicated, legal remedies are limited, criminal proceedings are slow and rarely result in convictions. At the same time, the campaign financing system incentivizes abuse: depending on the number of candidates, parties can receive between 680 million and over 1 billion forints in public funding.

Transparency International and Political Capital estimated that sham parties absorbed around 3 billion forints in public funds in 2018 alone.

Pocket money for personal data

We also received a Facebook post circulating in Eastern-Hungary’s Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county that sheds new light on the situation. According to the post, a „foreign donor” is offering 5,000 forints (approximately 12 euros) per person to residents willing to photocopy their ID — and those of their children under 16 — at a local restaurant.

In other words, people are handing over all their personal data to unknown individuals for a small sum.

The post claims the „donations” can be collected at the local cultural center — an institution run by the municipality.

Such an operation is risky in multiple ways: on one hand, it could serve as a basis for election fraud, since with the required data, fake recommendation sheets can be mass-produced. On the other, it enables organized voting schemes, targeted mobilization, or even voter transportation if individuals are listed and tracked.

In 2023, the same restaurant hosted a leadership meeting of a Roma party backed by Fidesz, and is also registered as the address of an organization called “Rising Star Roma Women’s Association,” which received 11 million forints in public funds in 2024 and 7 million last year from the state-owned Bethlen Fund. The head of this organization is currently a candidate on a national minority list and regularly appears at events with Fidesz politicians.

Written and translated by Hanna Solti. Cover photo: Element5 Digital / Unsplash. Our election site with data and infographics is available at valasztas2026.atlatszo.hu.